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et al.: Freedom Of Speech & Press

FREEDOM OF SPEECH & PRESS
N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 8:
Every citizen may freely speak, write andpublish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsiblefor the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passedto restrain or abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech.., or of the press ....
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT

Larchmont Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n v.
Larchmont/Mamaroneck Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. 1
(decided July 25, 1994)
Plaintiff, Larchmont Professional Fire Fighters Association,
commenced an action to recover damages for defamation against
Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. and Marc Burell, a paid
firefighter and member of the plaintiff union2 based on an article
and five letters to the editor appearing in the Daily Times.3 The
appellate division affirmed the lower court's decision granting the
defendants' respective motions to dismiss, 4 holding that the

1. 206 A.D.2d 507, 615 N.Y.S.2d 73 (2d Dep't 1994).
2. M. at 507, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
3. Id. Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. is the ovner of the Daily
Times. Id.

4. Id. There were two motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, each made by a different defendant. Id.
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inflammatory statements involved were protected opinion under
7
both the State 5 and Federal 6 Constitutions.
The allegedly defamatory newspaper article published in the
Daily Times described charges 8 which were filed by the plaintiff
union against defendant Marc Burrell, a paid firefighter of the
City of New Rochelle. 9 Burrell stated in the article that the
reason his union filed the charges was "in retaliation for a
complaint he filed that the emergency medical workers from the
Larchmont Fire Department were slow in calling for the
Volunteer Ambulance Corps." 10 Burrell claimed that his
volunteer work, which allegedly violated a union regulation, had
been common knowledge for seven years 11 and referred to the
12
charges as "sour grapes."
The plaintiffs also objected to five letters to the editor
published in the Daily Times. 13 These letters, which were in
response to the allegedly defamatory article, voiced support and
praise to Burrell for working as a volunteer firefighter for the
Larchmont-Mamaroneck Volunteer Ambulance Corps and the
Town of Mamaroneck. 14 The letters also criticized the union for
instituting the charges and unfairly prosecuting Burrell. 15 In
5. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section provides in relevant part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in relevant
part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press. "Id.
7. Larchmont, 206 A.D.2d at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
8. The charges stated that Burrell violated a "union stricture" by
volunteering for both the Larchmont-Mamaroneck Volunteer Ambulance
Corps and the Town of Mamaroneck's volunteer firefighters. Id. at 507, 615
N.Y.S.2d at 74.
9. Id. at 507, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
10. Id.
11. Id. These seven years were the amount of time Burrell had worked as a
paid firefighter for the City of New Rochelle.
12. Id. at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
13. Id. at 507, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
14. Id. at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
15. Id.
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response to the letters and the article, plaintiffs brought an action
in the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, to recover
damages from the defendants for defamation. 16 The defendants
made two motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. 17 The court granted both motions and the
plaintiffs appealed. 18
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the
orders dismissing the complaint after reviewing the statements in
both the article and the letters. The court held that the speech
consisted of pure opinions which were protected under the New
York State Constitution. 19 The court explained that "[u]nder the
New York State Constitution, expressions of pure opinion are
afforded greater protection than under the Federal
Constitution." 20 The court cited Steindilber v. Alphonse2 l after
explaining that "[a] pure opinion is a statement of opinion which
is accompanied by a recitation of the facts upon which it is based
or does not imply that it is based upon undisclosed facts." 22
Although the Steinhilber2 3 court disavowed any rigid test for
16. Id. at 507, 615 N.Y.S.2d'at 74.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
20. Id.
21. 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1986). Plaintiff,
Louise Steinhilber, was a member of the Local 1120 of the Communications
Workers of America union who worked during a union strike. Id. at 286-87,
501 N.E.2d at 551, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 902. She was fited, but never paid the
fine and eventually quit the union. Plaintiff later brought suit against the
union's 'vice-president, Richard Martini, based on a tape recording he made
which directed numerous insults at the plaintiff. Id. at 287, 501 N.E.2d at
551, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 902. On a message played on the union's phone line, the
defendant stated plaintiff lacked "talent, ambition, and initiative." Id. Plaintiff
included the union's area representative in the suit and alleged that he
displayed a banner on his pickup truck during a union picket which read "#1
SCAB LOUISE STEINHILBER SUCKS." Id. at 288, 501 N.E.2d at 551, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 902.
22. Larchmont,206 A.D.2d at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
23. The Steinhilber case is the leading authority in New York for
determining protected speech. See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowskd, 77
N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied, 500 U.S.
954 (1991).
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distinguishing fact from opinion, it did suggest four factors cited
in Olman v. Evans24 which should be considered:
(1) an assessment of whether the specific language in issue has a
precise meaning which is readily understood or whether it is
indefinite and ambiguous; (2) a determination of whether the
statement is capable of being objectively characterized as true or
false; (3) an examination of the full context of the
communication in which the statement appears; and (4) a
consideration of the broader social context or setting surrounding
the communication including the existence of any applicable
customs or conventions which might 'signal to readers or
listeners that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion,
25
not fact.'
The Steinhilber court concluded the expressions at issue to be
non-actionable opinion based on the full context of the
expressions in their surrounding circumstances. 2 6 The court in
Larchmont held the statements therein were pure opinions and
therefore protected under the New York State Constitution. 27 The
court explained its reasoning, by stating that "the expressions of
opinion in the newspaper article and letters to the editor were
adequately supported by the statement of the underlying facts,
and did not imply that they were based on undisclosed facts." 28
The court also held that the speech was not reasonably
susceptible to a defamatory meaning under the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 2 9 In reaching its decision, the
court judged the statements based on federal defamation
standards, 30 citing Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski.31 In
24. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
25. Steinhilber, 68 N.Y.2d at 292, 501 N.B.2d at 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
905 (quoting Olman, 750 F.2d at 983).

26. Id. at 293-94, 501 N.E.2d at 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 906. The
expressions were made during a heated union strike. Id.
27. Larchmont, 206 A.D.2d at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
28. Id.
29. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. Larchmont, 206 A.D.2d at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74. Although the

opinion of the court did not explicitly state that both the federal and state
standards for defamation were applied, it is clear from the terms used and tie
cases cited that the court had specifically used first the federal and then the
It
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Immuno A.G., the court began its defamation inquiry with the
federal test, stating the key question is whether the "challenged
expression, however labeled by defendant, would reasonably
appear to state or imply assertions of objective fact." 32 The
Immuno A.G. court added that the impression created by the
statements and the general tone of the expressions must be
considered as viewed by the reasonable person. 33 After factoring
the case of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal CO. 3 4 into its current
understanding of the federal test for defamation, the court in
Immuno A.G. stated: "[E]xcept for special situations of loose,
figurative, hyperbolic language, statements that contain or imply
5
assertions of provably false fact will likely be actionable."3
Although the Immuno A.G. court ultimately held that the plaintiff
failed to satisfy his burden of proving the defendant's statement

state test for protected speech in deciding this case. For example, when
initially discussing the court's review of the statements in the article and
letters, the court referred to them'as "rhetorical hyperbole rather than objective
fact," using language from Milkovich v. Lorain, 497 U.S. 1 (1990), thus
indicating the.statements had met the federal standard for protected speech.
Larchmont, 206 A.D.2d at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
31. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied,
500 U.S. 954 (1991). The plaintiff brought suit for libel based on a letter to
the editor published in the Journal of Medical Primatology, a journal cofounded and edited by the defendant Dr. J.Moor-JankowskI. Id at 240, 567
N.E.2d at 1227, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The letter criticized the plaintiff's
planned use of chimpanzees to conduct hepatitis research in Africa. Id. The
letter stated that plaintiff's plan was motivated by a desire to avoid restrictions
on the importation of chimpanzees which could eventually decimate the wild
chimp population, and could spread hepatitis to the whole chimpanzee
population. Id. at 241, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908. Plaintiff
also objected to an article in another magazine in which defendant is quoted as
criticizing the plaintiff's plan. Id. at 241, 567 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 908-09.
32. Id. at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
33. Id. at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
34. 497 U.S. 1 (1990). Imnmno A.G. was on remand from the United
States Supreme Court for the purpose of evaluating that case in light of the
recent Milkovich decision.
35. ImmunoA.G., 77 N.Y.2d at 245, 567 N.E.2d at 1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d
at 911.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1995], Art. 37

940

TO URO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

to be false, 36 the court in Larchmont did not have to inquire as
deeply because it found the statements in the article and letters to
be constitutionally protected opinion and not statements of
37
objective fact.
When the assertion of an alleged opinion is being analyzed by
the courts in order to determine whether it is protected speech, it
is given greater deference by the New York State test than it is
afforded under the federal test for defamation. 3 8 The State of
New York chose this test specifically for the purpose of giving its
citizens extra protection beyond that afforded under the federal
test. 39 The New York State courts accomplish this goal by
evaluating the expression in the full context in which it was
made, whereas the federal courts tend to isolate the statements
40
more when deciding defamation cases.
SUPREME COURT
BRONX COUNTY

Cruz v. Latin News Impacto Newspaper 41
(printed June 7, 1994)
The plaintiff claimed that a newspaper article written about her
was libelous. 42 The defendants moved for summary judgment

36. Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
37. Larchmont, 206 A.D.2d at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.

38. See generally 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d
130, 145, 603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992).
39. See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 249, 567 N.B.2d
1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d 913, cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).

40. The New York State Court of Appeals disagrees with the dissection of
expressions at issue in defamation cases because that process "may result in

identifying many more implied factual assertions than would a reasonable
person encountering that expression in context." Id. at 255, 567 N.t.2d at
1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
41. N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1994, at 23 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1994).
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